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Abstract: This paper proposes a novel system-wide multi-state framework to model state occupations
and the transitions among current, delinquency, default, prepayment, repurchase, short sale and
foreclosure on mortgage loans. The approach allows for the modelling of the progression of borrowers
from one state to another to fully understand the risks of a cohort of borrowers over time. We use a
multi-state Markov model to model the transitions to and from various states. The key factors affecting
the transition into various loan outcomes are the ability to pay as measured by debt-to-income ratio,
equity as marked by loan-to-value ratio, interest rates and the property type. Our findings have
broader policy implications for better decision-making on granting loans and the design of debt relief
and mortgage modification policies.
Keywords: credit risk; survival analysis; multi-state models; delinquency; recovery; relief programs;
mortgage modification
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1. Introduction
Housing wealth is typically the largest component of wealth for many households and
mortgages are their main source of credit (Campbell 2013). During the recent global financial
crises, mortgage debt triggered a wave of foreclosures that impacted household consumption,
balance sheets as well as the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy (Mian et al. 2015;
Di Maggio et al. 2017). Consequently, households in many economies are still struggling to escape the
aftermath (Mesnard et al. 2016; Ozkan and Unsal 2012; Whelan 2013). Consumer welfare has been
jeopardised, and the ability of consumers to meet their loan obligations has been severely affected.
As such, many economies experience rising impaired loans, which are choking the financial sector and
the overall performance of their economies (Whelan 2013).
The critical role of the mortgage market in triggering the recent global financial crisis has increased
policy interest, bank regulation and academic research in this area. The banking regulatory framework
changes brought by the revised Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Accords (later
adopted by national legislation in many countries and regions, for instance, the European Capital
Requirement Directives and the US Regulatory Capital Rules) introduced stronger risk management
requirements for banks, with capital requirements tightly coupled to estimated credit portfolio losses.
The recently adopted IFRS9 and FASB’s Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) standards introduce
revised expected credit loss or impairment calculation rules requiring financial institutions to calculate
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expected loss for the banking book over the entire life of the exposures. Encouraged by regulators,
banks devoted significant resources to develop an Internal Ratings Based approach (IRB) for the
calculation of risk weighted assets for credit risk to better support decisions when granting loans,
to‘quantify expected credit losses and to assign the mandatory economic capital.1 Other than for banks
and lenders, rigorous credit risk analysis in this area is also of importance for sound economic policy
making (Kelly and O’Malley 2016) and for the design of social insurance programs (Bhutta et al. 2017)
as evidenced in many countries and US states now enforcing laws to protect mortgage borrowers and
mutualising some of the costs of default.
We argue that, in distressed economic environments, the focus should go beyond modelling
defaults and foreclosures as the only main outcomes and should explicitly allow for other loan-level
transitions both into and out of default together with other state occupation experienced by obligors.
For instance, it is of paramount importance and informative for policy to understand the progression
of mortgagors from normal performance to delinquency, and subsequently to default and foreclosure
as well as the cure from delinquency or default to normal performance. For the US market as an
example, understanding of cures is particularly important to gauge if strategies implemented by lenders
and other policy interventions such as the US Treasury Department’s Home Affordable Refinance
Program (HARP) and the Federal Housing Administration’s Home Affordable Modification Program
(FHA-HAMP) were effective in cutting down losses and preventing ruthless default by underwater
mortgagors (Tracy and Wright 2016; Agarwal et al. 2015, 2017; Liu and Sing 2018). Empirical evidence
suggests that these debt relief programs had mixed success in preventing foreclosure. In addition,
the transition into other competing and absorbing states such as repayment, repurchase or short sale is
of great importance as they are significant competing risks that can affect the profitability and solvency
of lending institutions. For banks and other lenders, the accurate estimation of these remain essential
for pricing, interest and liquidity risk management, profit forecasting, managing delinquents and
capital provisioning.
Motivated by the fixed income market transition-based credit risk assessment methods such as
the McKinsey’s CreditPortfolioView (McKinsey and Company 1998) and JP Morgan’s Creditmetrics
(Gupton et al. 1997), this paper contributes to the literature by offering a novel system-wide framework
for analysing mortgage loans which exposes insights which cannot be generated by the traditional
approaches. The approach allows for the modelling of the progression of borrowers from one
state to another to fully understand the risks of a cohort of borrowers over time. The framework
has seven allowable states (current, delinquent, default, prepayment, foreclosure, repurchase and
short sale) and sixteen possible transitions to jointly model state occupations and the transitions
among current, delinquency, default, prepayment, repurchase, short sale and foreclosure on mortgage
loans. The framework thus combines aspects of credit risk (delinquency, default and foreclosure
and self-cure/recovery) with aspects of interest rate and liquidity risk (prepayment, short sale and
self-cure/recovery). A multi-state Markov model is used to model the transitions. The study thus
goes beyond modelling default or foreclosure as the only risk on mortgages or the competing risks
of prepayment and foreclosure to include transient states of delinquency to allow the modelling of
recovery or cure from distress as well as introducing additional absorbing states of repurchase and
short sale into the multi-state framework. Using this framework, we also investigate the relationship
between the probability of loans transitioning to and from various loan outcomes and loan-level
covariates. We empirically test the performance of the model using the US single-family mortgage
loans originated during the first quarter of 2009 and were followed on their monthly repayment
performance until the third quarter of 2016.
1 The recently approved BCBS (Basel IV) reforms of the standardised (CR-SA) approach (by making it more granular and risk
sensitive) and of the CR-IRB approach for the calculation of risk weighted assets for credit risk will limit the extent to which
banks can reduce capital requirements through the use of internal models (e.g., by eliminating the option to use any IRB
approach for equity and advanced CR-IRB for institutions and large corporations).
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Our findings thus have broader policy implications for contract design, lender and borrower
behaviour analysis, for the mitigation of defaults and foreclosures through the design of debt relief
programs and mortgage modification policies and for the design of laws for protecting distressed
borrowers. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on commonly
applied methods and the factors affecting repayment of mortgage loans whilst Section 3 presents the
methodological approaches used in the study. In Section 4, the statistical analysis and results are
presented. Section 5 provides a summary of the study and concludes.
2. Literature Review
Many studies have looked at factors affecting mortgage repayment with most of them focusing on
default or foreclosure especially in the USA real estate market and a sizable number on the UK market.
Taking mortgage default as a (put) option, early literature used the Black and Scholes (1973) pioneered
contingent claims framework. Using this approach, the key drivers of default were home values
and interest rates (Gerardi et al. 2013). Riddiough (1991) provided early insights on the modelling of
“trigger events” such as job loss, health shocks, divorce and other accidents. Similarly, Kau et al. (1993);
Deng et al. (1996) and many other researchers assessed effects of these trigger events on default
and foreclosure and produced mixed findings on the factors which matters the most. Schwartz and
Torous (1993) reported loan vintage and housing index returns volatility as the key drivers of observed
default behaviour. Deng et al. (2000) argued that negative events such as job losses and divorces were
significant predictors of mortgage default. Using data on mortgages originated between 2003 and 2007,
Mayer et al. (2009) found unemployment and house prices as the key predictors of delinquency in the
USA market.
In response to the mortgage default and foreclosure crises which began in 2007, an increased number
of researchers analysed and documented numerous factors as the determinants of the observed default
and foreclosure behaviour. One of the key hypotheses regarding the causes of mortgage delinquency is
that homeowners will not continue servicing a mortgage if they enter into negative equity, for instance,
if the value of the property drops below the mortgage value (Kau et al. 1992; Kelly and O’Malley 2016).
In this approach, a mortgage is seen as an American option with strike price equal to the value of the
mortgage and the property being the underlying asset. It is assumed that the borrower will default
as soon as the option enters into the in-the-money zone, that is when the property value falls below
the mortgage value. This was also referred to as ruthless or strategic default, a term used to describe
a borrower in negative equity who chooses to default despite having enough financial resources to
continue servicing the mortgage (Gerardi et al. 2013).
Chan et al. (2014) found that loan and individual characteristics such as borrowers credit history,
current loan-to-value, race, ethnicity and income are key drivers of foreclosure. Guiso et al. (2009)
found severe negative equity, gender, future employment expectations, race and morality as key
determinants of ruthless or strategic default. Long term unemployment as well as falling home
prices which led to negative equity were also found to be key drivers of observed mortgage defaults,
foreclosures and housing vacancies (Jones et al. 2016; Tian et al. 2016).
Foote et al. (2008) also assessed this concept of negative equity on mortgage default decisions
and found that some mortgagors who were in negative equity did not default and argued that this
could partly be explained by price expectations. Consistent with that, Foote et al. (2008) also indicated
that mortgagors who were in negative equity and defaulted could have done so not only because of
negative equity but due to a “double trigger” effect (negative equity combined with some adverse
event such as loss of employment, health issues, death of spouse, divorce, etc.). In agreement with
the double trigger hypothesis, numerous other studies also documented that mortgagors could be in
negative equity and still not default (Elul et al. 2010; Bhutta et al. 2010, 2017).
Bhutta et al. (2017) estimated the level of indebtedness and negative equity that triggers ruthless
default on mortgages using U.S. data from 2007 to 2009 and found that, for most homeowners,
the equity has to be deeply negative before they take the default option. Ahlawat (2018) also supported
Risks 2020, 8, 64 4 of 28
the argument that many mortgage defaults are non-ruthless and that transaction costs are the key
driver of the mortgage default decision. Consistently, other studies which characterise mortgage
default as non-ruthless argue that transaction costs (for instance, legal fees, relocation costs and credit
impairment costs) and other idiosyncratic factors are important factors driving mortgage default
decisions (Vandell 1995; Ahlawat 2018).
Using UK data, Aron and Muellbauer (2010) concluded that experiencing negative equity is just
one of the fundamental economic drivers of payment delinquency, along with the debt service ratio
and the unemployment rates. Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005) used a two-step procedure and a
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model of mortgage outcomes to estimate probabilities of prepaid
and default. The authors concluded that very delinquent loans are more likely to prepay than to
default and that prepayment rates increase substantially as delinquency intensity increases. Again,
using UK data, Aron and Muellbauer (2016) found that the aggregate debt-service ratio, the proportion
of mortgages in negative equity and the unemployment rate have significant effects on aggregate rates
of repossessions and arrears. Tian et al. (2016) documented that household and local unemployment
rates were key drivers of mortgage defaults. Carranza and Estrada (2013) found house prices and debt
balances as the maid drivers of mortgage default in Colombia.
Another key factor explaining mortgage delinquency is the inability to reimburse. This is likely to
happen when a reduction in disposable income, often triggered by unemployment spells or family
events (for instance, divorce or death of a spouse) reduces the capacity to continue servicing the
mortgage. Gerardi et al. (2007); Elul et al. (2010); Bajari et al. (2008); Fuster and Willen (2017) and
Bhutta et al. (2010) also emphasised the role of cash flow problems or illiquidity as an important factor
explaining the inability to continue paying a mortgage loan as someone who is highly illiquid may not
be able to find the cash to make the loan payment and may find it costly to wait for house prices to
recover. Fuster and Willen (2017) documented the effect of payment size as an important determinant
of default and cure (recovery from delinquency) stating as high as 40% reduction in default rates due
to a 2% reduction in interest rates. Similarly, they found a 75% increase in the cure hazard caused
by a 2–2.5% reduction in interest rates. Tracy and Wright (2016) found that a reduction in monthly
payment under the HARP reduced loses on credit by about 56 basis points. Bajari et al. (2013) studied
the relative importance of different drivers of default and concluded that principal write downs have a
huge impact on borrowers’ default behaviour and welfare.
Apart from the characteristics of borrowers and loans, recent research on the severity of the
housing slump in the U.S. during the recession suggests that several features related to both rigidity
of mortgage contracts and market frictions hampered public and private efforts to restructure or
refinance households, augmenting the incidence of costly foreclosures (for instance, Piskorski et al. 2010;
Di Maggio et al. 2017; Piskorski and Seru 2018; Fuster and Willen 2017). Contract rigidity, particularly
the fact that most mortgage contracts were locked at high interests rates given that they were fixed
rate mortgages (FRMs) prevented borrowers from receiving an automatic debt relief compared to
Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) featuring no interest rate floors, increasing the likelihood of
households to be delinquent on their loans. Other important documented market frictions include:
(i) equity refinancing constraints (getting debt relief through refinancing of FRMs mortgages being
impossible for households due insufficient equity to meet the LTV requirements mainly due to a drop
in home prices); (ii) intermediary organisational constraints and lack of effective competition especially
within the refinancing market resulting in limited debt relief or refinancing; (iii) agency conflicts in
servicing of largely securitised mortgages; and (iv) moral hazard concerns in that by offering debt
relief to distressed borrowers, many solvent borrowers could stop making payments to enjoy similar
benefits (Piskorski and Seru 2018).
In terms of methods, several approaches are used for consumer credit risk assessment.
The work of Altman (1968) pioneered this area with the Z score discriminant analysis model. Today,
the logistic regression has become the standard for the industry (Crook et al. 2007; Noh et al. 2005;
Lessmann et al. 2015). Bajari et al. (2008) developed a US sub-prime market scoring model using a
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bivariate probit model allowing borrowers to default either because the mortgage to equity ratio goes
above a certain value (due to, for instance, falling home prices) such that by defaulting, borrowers tend
to increase their lifetime wealth or due to insufficient income and/or lack of access to other forms of
credit. Many studies to date have focused on improving the default prediction accuracy by considering
both traditional statistical methods and more sophisticated (e.g., advanced machine learning)
modelling approaches and alternative sets of predictor features. Discriminant analysis, support
vector machines, artificial neural networks, decision trees, genetic programming and standard models
using external ratings provided by external credit assessment institutions have also been successfully
applied (Arminger et al. 1997; Hand and Henley 1997; Kruppa et al. 2013; Lessmann et al. 2015;
Butaru et al. 2016; Baesens et al. 2003; Abellán and Castellano 2017). Less attention has been given
to modelling default as a dynamic process even if empirical studies have shown that models that
account for the dynamism in default may be conceptually more appropriate and can result in better
results (Du Jardin and Séverin 2011; Volkov et al. 2017). Grimshaw and Alexander (2011) modelled
the transition matrix of movement of loans between delinquent states as a Markov chain but did not
forecast transition probabilities using loan-level covariates adopting instead a term structure of credit
risk spreads approach.
Above these, other methods such as survival models have been identified as superior to the former
due to their ability to incorporate time varying covariates such as macroeconomic conditions which
affect performance on loan payment over time (Castro 2013) and the ability to forecast event occurrence
(default, recovery, prepayment, foreclosure) in the next instant of time, given that the event has not
occurred until that time (Bellotti and Crook 2013; Chamboko and Bravo 2016). Commonly, survival
models have been used to model the risk of defaulting (Bellotti and Crook 2013; Noh et al. 2005;
Sarlija et al. 2009; Tong et al. 2012; Chamboko and Bravo 2019a). Several studies have also used the
same to model foreclosure on mortgages (Gerardi et al. 2007) and also cure from delinquency to current
(Ha and Krishnan 2012; Chamboko and Bravo 2016, 2019b; Ha 2010). The competing risks survival
framework has also been used to model the competing risks of early payment and default on loan
contracts (Deng et al. 1996; Stepanova and Thomas 2002).
The option-based model of default has also been widely used in the USA (Kau et al. 1992;
Deng et al. 2000) and UK markets (Ncube and Satchell 1994) to characterise mortgage default as
ruthless or mainly influence by the relation of price of houses and value of mortgages. These models
define default as an American option with the strike price equal to the value of the mortgage and then
assume that a borrower will default as soon as the property value falls to or below the mortgage value
(Kelly and O’Malley 2016), particularly when the lender has no recourse. A major limitation of these
models is that defaults are usually defined the same way as foreclosures, thus ignoring additional
important options for borrowers, for instance cure or prepayment.
As observed in the literature above, most of the studies investigated mortgage delinquency,
default or foreclosure as the main outcomes of interest. Limited literature is available on the modelling
of the cure from delinquency to current as well as the transition to other states such as early payment,
and none on repurchase and short sale as mortgage loan outcomes. Usually, these studies modelled
one outcome of interest at any time, thus missing on the dynamics of the portfolio with the passage
of time. By modelling the occurrence of multiple loan events at the same time and their recurrences,
we offer a much richer perspective than these traditional approaches.
3. Modelling Intermediate Events and Multiple Loan Outcomes
3.1. Competing Risks
Competing risks generalise the standard survival analysis (Beyersmann et al. 2012) and refers
to a situation where there is more than one cause of failure or outcomes (i.e., foreclosure, short
sale or early payment). As such, competing risks models are meant to deal with situations where
there is one initial state and multiple and mutually exclusive absorbing states (Deng et al. 1996;
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Stepanova and Thomas 2002). Among the competing risks, only the first one to occur is observed.
Diagrammatically, a simple illustrative competing risks model is presented as follows (Figure 1).Risks 2020, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 29 
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default before foreclosure, thus having i termediat st s which are neither i it al nor absorbing.
Should the intermediate and later vents b of interest, the competing risks approach will fail to ful y
utilise the ava able data to underst nd loan rep yment behaviour. In such instance , exte io s of
competi g risk odels, particularly multistate models, are applicable.
3.2. ulti-State odels
ulti-state odels are extensions of the co peting risk odels that odel events as transitions
between states and include co peting risks as a special case (Putter et al. 2007). They allow the
odelling of events of different types as well as both intermediate and subsequent events. It is
often assumed that a multi-state model is a Markov model with the Markov property stating that the
transition rate is independent of both the states visited prior to the current state and the sojourn ti e
(length of stay in current state). In other words, the future depends on history only through the present.
In this paper, we focus on discrete-time Markov chains with a finite set of states since mortgage data
are observed at discrete-time intervals. It is assumed that the state space of the model characterise all
the possible states in which the loan can be in.
Andersen and Keiding (2002) described a multi-state process as a stochastic process (X(t), t ∈ T)
with a finite state space S =
{
1, . . . p
}
and with right continuous sample path: X(t+) = X(t), with
T = [0, τ] or [0, τ) with τ ≤ +∞. The process has initial distribution πh(0) = Prob(X(0) = i), i ∈ S.
The multi-state process X(.) generated a history Xt (an σ-algebra) which contains the history of the
process in the interval [0, t]. This history consists of both information relating to the previous states
visited and the time spent in previous states. With this history, we can define transition probabilities by:
Pi j(s, t) = Prob(X(t) = j
∣∣∣X(s) = i, XS−) (1)
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where Pi j(s, t) is the probability of being in state j at time t given that the subject was in state i at time s.
If T is the time needed to reach state j from i, the transition intensity (hazard rate) of i→ j transition
is given by (Andersen and Keiding 2002):
λi j(t) = lim∆t→0




A state i ∈ S is absorbing if all t ∈ T, i ∈ S, j , i, λi j(t) = 0, otherwise i is transient. Where there is











where Ni j(s) represents the number of transitions observed from state i to state j at time s and Yi(s)
represents the number of uncensored individuals in state i at time s. The transition probabilities can
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with Pi j(s, t) entries, where I is the identity matrix and ∆Λ(u) is a matrix containing elements
∆Λi j(u), representing the change in the cumulative transition rate between states i and j at time
u. The Aalen–Johansen estimator (Aalen and Johansen 1978) is used to estimate the transition
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)
(5)
where ∆Λ̂(u) is the observed change in matrix Λ̂(u) which represents the estimates of the cumulative
hazard of transitioning from state i to state j at time u.
For mortgage repayments, all individuals start in the same state (performing/current), thus we
can have M, the initial state (at time 0) for the multi-state model. We can also define the cumulative
incidence function (CIF) for states Z as follows:








where Tz is the time to transition from any other state to state Z.
The transition probabilities depend on time t, or, more generally, on a set of individual, loan-level,
or macroeconomic time-dependent explanatory variables. To analyse the relationship between the
characteristics of borrowers and loans and their transition rates, we model transition intensities as
functions of both acquisition and performance explanatory variables. To be more specific, we use
a proportional hazards Cox model and a multiplicative structure with a common baseline i→ j
transition intensity Pi j,0(s, t). For an individual mortgage contract, m, with time-fixed covariates
Xm = Xmk, the transition intensity is modelled as:
P(m)i j (s, t) = P
(0)
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where P(0)i j (s, t) is the baseline hazard, which captures the shape of the hazard function and summarises




quantifies the effect of a given covariate Xmk on the transition intensity. We used R package mstate to
fit the multi-state model and to estimate the state or transition probabilities P(s, t) and the cumulative
transition rates Λ(u) whilst the survival package was used for fitting the transition specific prognostic
survival models.
4. Statistical Analysis and Results
4.1. Data
The study analysed 383,770 mortgage contracts from the Fannie Mae single-family mortgage loans
originated during the first quarter of 2009 followed on their monthly repayment performance until the
third quarter of 2016. This is an interesting period to analyse the credit performance of US mortgage
loans, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the entrance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
Conservatorship in September 2008. Besides, there was an ushering of significant monetary policy
changes which lowered interest rates to historic lows levels; the introduction of two large-scale debt
relief programs, namely the Home Affordable Refinancing Program (HARP) and the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP); and the creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in
October 2008. Again, this period witnessed the signing of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act legislation in July 2010, the regulation of the financial industry, efforts to
halt predatory mortgage lending and encouraging transparency for consumers to be able understand
conditions relating to their mortgages before making contractual commitments. During this period,
cash sales peaked, home prices hit bottom and foreclosure rates reached record high by mid 2010.
The delinquency rate only dropped below 4% for first the time in March 2015 since the start of the crisis.
The sample is geographically dispersed in the United States and covers loans that were originated in
all states.
The primary dataset has a subset of Fannie Mae’s 30-year and less FRMs. Static acquisition and a
selected number of dynamic performance variables were considered for modelling the various loan
outcomes. Tables 1 and 2 present the loan acquisition and loan performance variables, respectively.
Table 1. Acquisition Variables.
Acquisition Variables Description/Values
Loan Identifier Mortgage loan unique identifier.
Origination Date MM/YYYY
Loan Purpose
An indicator that denotes if a mortgage loan in a pool
is either a purchase money mortgage or
refinance mortgage.
Product Type Fixed-rate mortgage or adjustable-rate mortgage.
Property Type Single-Family (SF), Condo (CO), Co-Op (CP),Manufactured Housing (MH), PUD (PU)
Relocation Mortgage Indicator Yes/No
Channel/ Origination Type Retail (R), broker (B), correspondent (C)
Borrower Credit Score 300–850
Co-Borrower Credit Score 300–850




Calculated at origination and is obtained by dividing
the borrower’s total monthly obligations by stable
monthly income.
First-Time Homebuyer Indicator Denotes if a borrower is a first-time homebuyer.
Number of Borrowers Number of individuals who are obligated to repaythe loan.
Number of Units The number of units the mortgaged property has.
Occupancy Status Indicates how the borrower used the mortgagedproperty at the time of origination.
Original Interest Rate Mortgage original interest rate
Original Loan Term The number of months for which a borrower’spayments are due
Original Loan-to-Value (LTV)
The Original LTV reflects the loan-to-value ratio of
the loan amount secured by a mortgaged property on
the origination date of the underlying mortgage loan.
Original Unpaid Principal Balance (UPB) The original amount of the mortgage loan asindicated by the mortgage documents.
Source: Fannie Mae.
Table 2. Performance Variables.
Performance Variables Description/Values
Current Loan/Delinquency Status
The number of days (months) a borrower is
delinquent, i.e., 0 = Current, or < 30 days overdue;
1 = 30–59 days; 2 = 60–89;
3 = 90–119; and so on.
Modification Flag Y = Yes, N = No
Monthly Reporting Period MM/DD/YYYY
Loan Age Number of months after origination
Zero balance code Reason mortgage loan’s balance was reduced to zero,e.g., 01= prepaid; 03 = Short Sale; and so on.
Source: Fannie Mae.
4.2. Conceptual Framework
Table 3 defines and describes the different stages or states in the progression of a mortgage loan
contract included in the Fannie Mae dataset. Some states (e.g., prepayment) refer to a “terminal” status,
i.e., not subject to change, while others (e.g., delinquency) indicate that loan status can change as it
continues to move through its lifecycle.
As depicted in Figure 2, we propose a multi-state model framework with seven allowable states
numbered 1–7 with 16 possible transitions. State 1 is the initial state and States 4–7 are absorbing (final)
whilst States 1–3 are transient (intermediate). The transition from one state to the other is presented by
arrows from state i→ j .
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Table 3. States descriptions.
State Description
Current/normal performance This is when a borrower is up to date with paymentsor overdue by less than 30 days.
Delinquency When payments are 30–59 days overdue.
Default This is when a borrower missed payments for 60 daysor more consecutively.
Prepayment Occurs when a loan is paid in a shorter period thanagreed contractually.
Mortgage foreclosure Occurs when a borrower fails to pay in time or in fullinstalments and the lender repossesses the property.
Deed-in-Lieu, REO Disposition
This is when the borrower seeks release from the
mortgage contract by voluntarily transferring the title
of the property to the lender.
Short sale
This is when a homeowner sells a home for less than
the balance remaining on a mortgage and pays off all
(or a portion of) mortgage balance with the proceeds.
Recovery or cure This is when a borrower once in delinquency ordefault resumes making payments.
Source: Fannie Mae.
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4.3. Results and Discussion
4.3.1. Descriptive Statistics
Tables 4 and 5 present the characteristics of the borrowers, loans, properties purchased and some
borrower behavioural characteristics. On the borrowers, only about 5% were first time homebuyers,
with most of the contracts owned by two borrowers (median number of borrowers = 2). The credit
scores of the borrowers ranged from 508 to 850, averaging 763, whilst that of the co-borrowers were
almost the same, ranging from 505 to 850 and averaging 769.3. The debt-to-income ranged from 1% to
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64%, averaging at 33%. As depicted in Figure 3, the majority of the borrower’s DTI was between 20%
and 50%.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for categorical covariates.








































Table 5. Descriptive statistics for continuous covariates.
Variable Min 1stQuantile Median Mean
3rd




Score 508.0 741.0 773.0 763.0 793.0 850.0 40.06
Co-borrower’s
Credit Score 505.0 751.0 779.0 769.3 797.0 850.0 36.99
Debt-to-Income
Ratio 1 24 32 33.08 42.0 64.0 11.81
Number of
Borrowers 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.61 2.0 7.0 0.498
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Table 5. Cont.
Variable Min 1stQuantile Median Mean
3rd
Quartile Max Std Dev
Loan
characteristics
Loan-to-Value 3.0 60.0 73.0 68.77 80.0 97.0 15.65
Original Loan Term
(months) 301 360 360 359.9 360 360 1.88
Unpaid Principal
Balance 10,000 147,000 215,000 235,223.13 308,000 950,000 113,370.64
Original Interest




estimation (months) 0 30 41.0 45.77 58.0 92.0 24.63
Number of
transitions 0 1.0 1.0 1.27 1 63.0 2.156
Sojourned time
(months) 1.0 26 40.0 43.61 54 92.0 25.96
Source: Author’s preparation.
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Looking at the loan and property characteristics as well as the purpose, we observed that, even
though most of the borrowers were not first homebuyers, the majority (93%) used the mortgaged
property as their own residence, as indicated at the origination date. Only 15% were purchase money
mortgages with the other 85% as refinance mortgages. Almost three quarters of the properties were
single family properties, with 20% being planned urban developments and close to 7% as condominium
houses. After acquiring the mortgage, almost all borrowers did not relocate from that residency and
have also not sought modification of the mortgage.
The monetary value of the properties had a median value of $215,000. Using the loan-to-value
figures, the loan amounts averaged close to 70% of the value of the property, ranging from as low as 3%
to a maximum of 97% of the property value and the mean loan term was about 30 years (360 months).
The origination interest rate ranged from 1.88% to 8.625% averaging at 5%.
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4.3.2. Transition Matrix
The transition matrix (Table 6) summarises the state occupation probabilities or transitions
experienced by borrowers during the study period. The results show that only 11.6% of the borrowers
stayed current on their payments during the study follow-up period whilst 16.9% progressed into a
delinquent state. Most of the borrowers (71.4%) transitioned from current to prepayment. This high
prepayment finding was echoed by Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005) who concluded that prepayment
rates tend to increase as delinquency intensity rises. Again, the result is consistent with the assertion
that in declining mortgage interest rates scenarios refinancing incentives are more likely worthwhile,
especially given that these were fixed rate mortgages.
Table 6. Transition matrix.
To
Current Delinquency Default Repurchase Prepayment Foreclosure and Dil Short Sale
Current 0.116 0.169 0.0 0.001 0.714 0.0 0.0
From Delinquency 0.706 0.0 0.271 0.0 0.023 0.0 0.0
Default 0.749 0.0 0.0 0.011 0.054 0.127 0.06
Source: Author’s estimation.
For those who entered a delinquency state, 70.6% recovered (cured) whilst 27.1% defaulted and
2.3% progressed to prepayment. Of those who reached a default state, 74.9% cured, thus transitioning
back to the current state. The high recovery or cure for those both in delinquency and default states is
a desirable situation which in this case signalled the ability of borrowers to escape financial distress.
This could be attributed to various lenders strategies and policy interventions such as HARP which were
implemented in the aftermath of the financial crises to cut down losses and preventing ruthless default
by underwater mortgagors (Liu and Sing 2018). Another 12.7% of those who defaulted progressed to
foreclosure, whilst another 6% and 5.4% transitioned to short sale and prepaid, respectively.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number of transitions experienced by borrowers. Only 11.6%
of the borrowers had no transition at all, whilst about 54% transitioned (experienced event) only once,
thus Figure 4 is skewed towards zero transitions. The direction or the states where the borrowers
transitioned to are described in the transition matrix above (Table 6). Figure 5 shows the time spent
in a state before experiencing an event or transitioning to another state. This ranged 1–92 months
(Table 5). About 21% stayed in a state for three months or less before experiencing an event. On average,
one stayed in a state for about 40 months (median sojourned time) before transiting into another
state (Table 5). Further analysis shows that, on average, borrowers stayed in the “current” state for
about 40 months before transitioning whilst they stayed about seven months in a default state before
transitioning into an absorbing state (foreclosure, repurchase, short sale or prepaid).
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4.3.3. Cumulative Incidence Functions
Cumulative incidence functions giving the probability of a loan entering a given state before time
t are an interesting way to consider the economic significance of transition probabilities. Since the
current framework is not for a single risk event occurring per individual, but instead is a multi-state
scenario involving recurrent and multiple events, and at any transient state, a borrower had competing
risks likely to cause the occurrence of an event, and the cause specific failure probabilities are
therefore best described by cumulative incidence curves. The cumulative incidence functions in
Figures 6–9 thus quantify the cause-specific failure probabilities for selected transitions. In this case,
the dependent censoring arising from the competing causes renders the Kaplan–Meier estimator
(Kaplan and Meier 1958) inappropriate. As shown in Figure 6, the probability of borrowers in a current
state to transition to a delinquent state remained low (below 20%) across the duration of the study.
However, the probability of transitioning from current to a prepayment state started low during the
first months of a mortgage and gradually rose to around 20% after 40 months and at last a sudden
spike towards the end of the study period (Figure 7). This pattern could be explained by the declining
interest rates during the same period, thus increasing the incentive to prepay given that these were
fixed-rate mortgage loans.
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Figure 8 shows that borrowers who entered a delinquent state had a very high and encouraging
probability to revert to a current state within a month or two. We also note that, for the borrowers who
entered a default state, they also had encouragingly high probabilities of reverting to current (Figure 9).
The chances gradually rose during the first 20 months and then stagnated.
4.3.4. Prognostic Factors for Event Specific Transitions
In this section, we present the results obtained on the estimation of prognostic factors (covariates)
for event specific transitions using the proportional hazards model. We selected the most important
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transitions, as shown in the transition matrix (Table 6), which are current to delinquent and/or default,
current to prepaid, delinquent to current and default to current.
Current to Prepayment Transitions
Many factors potentially impact the prepayment decision including: (i) macroeconomic factors
(for instance, mortgage rates, housing market inflation and consumer confidence); (ii) loan-specific
factors (for instance, mortgage rate, type-FRM, ARM, Hybrid, original term, remaining term, loan
size, loan-to-value ratios, credit score, insurance costs, collateral and penalties); (iii) borrower-specific
factors (for instance, credit score, unemployment or loss of income, sickness or death of mortgagor or
in family, divorce or other life events and borrower sentiment); and (iv) others (for instance, mortgage
origination and servicing process). Additionally, one other motivation for prepaying a mortgage is
housing turnover, i.e., the sale of the home triggers a prepayment. Housing turnover is explained by a
multitude of factors, such as job changes and relocations, “trading up” (moving into a bigger home) of
young households or downsizing of older households, unemployment spells or life events.
Typically, US mortgage borrowers have the option of making partial/full prepayments of their
mortgage balances, possibly with a penalty, even when they do not have the intention to sell their houses.
In these later scenarios, prepayment is mainly associated with mortgage refinancing. An important
feature of the US mortgage market is that residential agency backed loans frequently allow for
penalty-free prepayments, encouraging sub-optimal prepayment behaviour and the adoption of
exogenous prepayment rules.2
Table 7, Column (1) presents the results on the prognostic factors for the transition from normal
performance (current) to prepayment. The results suggest that higher borrower’s credit score
(HR = 0.998 , p < 0.01), higher co-borrower credit score (HR = 0.998 , p < 0.01), higher number of
borrowers (HR = 0.905, p < 0.01), a higher debt-to-income ratio (HR = 0.999 , p < 0.1) and being
a first-time homebuyer (HR = 0.901 , p < 0.01) significantly reduced the propensity to transition
from a current state to prepayment. Equally important, longer loan terms (HR = 0.998 , p < 0.1),
having more units (HR = 0.753 , p < 0.01) and a higher loan-to-value ratio (HR = 0.996 , p < 0.01)
also reduced the chances of transitioning from current to prepayment whilst higher original principal
balances (HR = 1.01 , p < 0.01) and higher original interest rates (HR = 1.90, p < 0.01) increased the
chances to transition into prepayment. As expected, the costs of mortgages and the corresponding
refinancing incentives are among the most important drivers of prepayment. Given the FRMs in a
declining interest rate scenario, the prepayment option is in-the-money, reflecting the positive difference
between the value of the outstanding loan repayments at the current interest rate and the value of
outstanding loan repayments at the original loan interest rate. The higher are the initial interest rate
and principal balance, the higher is the refinancing incentive. The loan age (or seasoning) effect
of prepayment is confirmed in this study, with younger loans (longer loan terms) having a lower
probability of prepayment. Usually, a S-shaped relation between the rate of prepayment and the loan
age is observed (see, for instance, Charlier and Bussel 2003).
2 The early repayment of a mortgage significantly impacts both the bank’s profitability, via reduced interest margins, the loss
of foregone interest payments (less the risk of a default on the outstanding debt) and the bank’s interest rate and liquidity
positions. Prepayment creates a reinvestment risk problem for banks that must be addressed by appropriate Asset–Liability
Management (e.g., immunization) techniques (see, e.g., Bravo and Silva 2006).
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standard errors. A variable is omitted in the model when it does not carry enough data to run that model.
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With respect to the property type securing the mortgage loan, the results show that, compared
to condominiums, single-family home (HR = 1.1, p < 0.01) and planned urban development
(HR = 1.1, p < 0.01) were more likely to transition from current to prepayment and the opposite
was true for cooperative share (HR = 0.78, p < 0.01) and manufactured home (HR = 0.65, p < 0.01).
Property type has been shown to be significant in explaining mortgage prepayment and default
hazard rates in prior studies (see Vandell et al. 1993). The results also show that purchase money
mortgages were less likely to transition from current to prepayment compared to refinance mortgages
(HR = 0.979, p < 0.01). Similarly, borrowers who had their mortgage loans modified were twice as
likely to transition from a current state to prepayment (HR = 2.37, p < 0.01). Lenders can modify
the loan terms in many possible ways (for instance, reducing the interest rate, reducing the principal
balance, extending the maturity date of the loan) to offer financial relief for borrowers, enabling them
to resume their regularly scheduled payments. In any case, modifying the loan could mean having
issues with the loan or inability to repay, thus incentivising the need to get rid of the mortgage. Several
government programs were launched in the U.S. through 2008 and 2009 to encourage mortgage
modification as foreclosures spiked. Mortgage loans made to borrowers whose employers relocate
their employees were more likely to transition to prepayment (HR = 1.29, p < 0.01), confirming the
hypothesis that relocating for higher paying job opportunities is an in important factor triggering
house sales and mortgage prepayment.
On loan origination channel used, loans originated by retailers were less likely to transition to
prepayment compared to those originated by brokers (HR = 0.911, p < 0.01) and the opposite was
true for those originated by correspondents (HR = 1.03, p < 0.001). Considering how mortgaged
property was used at the time of origination, the results suggest that those who used property as the
principal residence (HR = 1.49, p < 0.01) or second home (HR = 1.32, p < 0.01) were more likely to
transition to prepayment compared to those who regarded these as investment property. This result
can be explained both by the fact that investors in income property do not relocate and by the fact
that investment property loans often carry a prepayment penalty consisting of a percentage of the
remaining principal outstanding.
Current to Delinquency and Default Transitions
Table 7, Column (2) presents the results on the factors affecting the transition from current to
a delinquency state suggesting difficulties in repaying mortgage loans. Considering the definition
applied in this study, delinquency is the state when a loan obligor had missed payments for 30–59 days
whilst consecutively missing payments for 60 days or more was defined as having defaulted. It is
therefore reasonable to say that the factors which affect the transition from current to delinquency
are the same for the delinquency to default transition since it is the same path with one-month
difference. As expected, higher credit scores for borrowers (HR = 0.989 , p < 0.01) or co-borrowers
(HR = 0.993 , p < 0.01) reduced the propensity to transition to a delinquency state.
Similarly, being a first-time homebuyer (HR = 0.791 , p < 0.01) significantly reduced the
propensity to get into a delinquency state. Typically, first-time homebuyers correspond to younger
households with lower income, lower home equity and lower credit scores when compared to repeat
homebuyers but this does not mean they necessarily default at a higher rate. Our results show that
first-time homebuyers prepay at a lower rate whilst at the same time do not default at a higher
rate. For lenders, our results show that, taking into account the borrower and loan characteristics at
origination and pricing appropriately the borrower’s risk and ability to reimburse, there is no evidence
that first-time homebuyer mortgages are intrinsically riskier than average repeat homebuyer mortgages.
This conclusion has potentially important policy implications since many (national, regional and
local) government policies provide numerous first-time homebuyers programs and opportunities to
make increase the affordability of homes (for instance, Good Neighbor Next Door, Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac).
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As also expected, a higher debt-to-income ratio (HR = 1.02, p < 0.01), longer loan term
(HR = 1.03, p < 0.01), higher loan-to-value ratio (HR = 1.01, p < 0.01), higher original loan amount
(HR = 1.01, p < 0.01) and higher original interest rate (HR = 1.48, p < 0.01) increased the chances of
borrowers to transition into a delinquency state. These results confirm previous evidence that the level
of household mortgage debt and debt-servicing ratio has a significant impact on household default
(see, for instance, Di Maggio et al. 2017). Moreover, our results suggest that the design of mortgages
is important to reduce default, increase welfare and to minimise the impact of foreclosures in the
economy. The typical FRM design in the US prevented many distressed borrowers from refinancing
in a declining interest (and inflation) rate scenario, triggering delinquency and default, impacting
household outcomes. Given the cyclicality of the economy, indexing mortgage payments to current
interest rates through, for instance, ARMs generates uncertainty in the stream of payments but has
the potential to alleviate distressed borrowers in crisis periods, improving household outcomes and
welfare. Standard ARMs reduce the debt burden of borrowers in crisis periods by automatically passing
interest rate reductions to households, by delivering larger payment reductions due to front-loading
and by mitigating the price declines and the price-default spiral (Guren et al. 2018).
Mortgage loans originated by retailers (HR = 0.785, p < 0.01) or correspondents
(HR = 0.897, p < 0.01) were less likely to get into a delinquency state compared to those originated by
brokers. The purpose of the mortgaged property at the origination date was also an important factor
explaining transiting into delinquency. Borrowers with properties which were their principal residence
(HR = 1.10, p < 0.01) had higher chances to fall into delinquency compared to those who regarded
these as investment property. Home homeownership is a form of wealth which owners can liquidated
should the need arises. However, homeowners have however to spend money on maintenance costs to
maintain the value of their investment over time. This means non-monetary costs (for instance, utility
loss of the foreclosed home, necessity to move, lower credit rating and moral or ethical breach) create
a disincentive to default on primary residences but that may not be sufficient to prevent default if
borrower’s are unable to make payments
On the property type securing the mortgage loan, borrowers who had planned urban
developments (HR = 0.993, p = 0.855), cooperative share (HR = 1.13, p = 0.402) and manufactured
homes (HR = 0.938, p = 0.565) were not significantly different from those with condominiums
whilst single-family homebuyers (HR = 1.1, p < 0.01) were more likely to transition from current
to a delinquency state. Compared to cash-out refinance, purchase money (HR = 0.819, p < 0.01)
and no cash-out refinance (HR = 0.852, p < 0.01) mortgages were less likely to transition into a
delinquency state. Borrowers who had their mortgage loans modified were five times more likely
to transition from current to a delinquency state (HR = 5.57, p < 0.01). Being a borrower, whose
employers relocate their employees (HR = 0.952, p = 0.713) and the number of borrowers per contract
(HR = 0.982, p = 0.713) were not important factors explaining the transition to delinquency.
Delinquent to Current Transition (Cure or Recovery)
Despite its intuitive appeal, empirical data show that lenders generally renegotiate a relatively
small proportion of their delinquent mortgages. Information gaps between borrowers and lenders,
institutional aspects and several market frictions (for instance, contract rigidity, equity refinancing
constraints, intermediary organisational constraints, state specific laws and regulations, mortgage
servicing incentives, loss of information in mortgage securitisation and bank-held or securitised
mortgage) have emerged as possible explanations for the scarcity of restructuring efforts. Lenders
typically ponder the costs and benefits of avoiding a foreclosure, including the possibility of
borrowers self-curing from delinquency without a renegotiation and redefault risk (see, for instance,
Piskorski et al. 2010; Fuster and Willen 2017). Repossessing collateral to resolve delinquent loans is
often a long and costly process for lenders. In economic terms, renegotiating a delinquent loan makes
sense when both parties consider a renegotiated loan as a better outcome than repossessing the property
or postponing a solution, in which case the arrears continue to rise. On the one hand, the moral-hazard
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cost of mortgage renegotiations may incentivise non-distressed borrowers to miss payments so that
they get a better deal (Mayer et al. 2014). Additionally, in most US states, laws governing mortgage
defaults and foreclosure allows lenders to use deficiency judgments processes to claim the debtor’s
other assets or earnings to settle any differences in case of foreclosure sales. This should in principle
discourage default and motivate more borrowers to resume to normal performance since default puts
the debtor’s other assets at risk.
In this study, we use loan, borrower and property characteristics to understand the probability of
cure including. Table 7, Column (3) presents the factors affecting the transition from a delinquency state
to a current state. This transition represents the cure or recovery of distressed borrowers back normal
performance (current). Mortgage loans with higher credit scores are more likely to be cured from a
delinquency state (HR = 1.01, p < 0.01). This means higher credit score borrowers strive to keep their
payments current even when they face financial constraints (for instance, short-term unemployment
and divorce) that may force them to miss a loan/interest repayment. The borrower credit score can be
considered to some extent a proxy for an individual’s ability to pay and willingness to pay since it
reflects past credit payment history, the extent of indebtedness, the length of credit history, recent credit
taken and the borrower’s resilience to income or liquidity shocks or life events. Similarly, a higher
number of borrowers per loan also increased the chances of recovering (HR = 1.04, p < 0.01). This can
be interpreted as the positive role of social capital on mortgage repayment.
As also expected, higher debt-to-income ratio (HR = 0.992, p < 0.01), higher loan-to-value ratio
(HR = 0.994, p < 0.01) and higher original interest rate (HR = 0.868, p < 0.01) reduced the chances
of recovering for the distressed borrowers. From this, it is clear that a prudent policy for increasing
the likelihood of cures in the event of delinquency and default should involve considering lower
loan-to-value ratio at loan origination and offering some debt relief in distressed periods, for instance,
through ARMs instead of FRMs. Similar conclusions were obtained in related studies (see, for instance,
Ahlawat 2018). Other factors which were significant include the type of the property, the purpose of
the loan, the type of occupancy and the origination channel. Purchase loans have higher probabilities
of cure than do refinance loans. Mortgage loans originated by retailers (HR = 0.941, p < 0.01) or
correspondents (HR = 0.978, p < 0.01) were less likely to recover compared to those originated by
brokers. Borrowers with properties which were their principal residence (HR = 0.818, p < 0.01) or
second home (HR = 0.91, p = 0.0193) had lower chances of recovering from delinquency compared
to those who regarded these as investment property.
On the property type securing the mortgage loan, borrowers who had planned urban developments
(HR = 0.95, p < 0.01) and single-family homebuyers (HR = 0.927, p = 0.015) were less likely to
recover compared to those with condominiums. Those with cooperative share (HR = 1.23, p = 0.024)
were more likely to recover whilst those with manufactured homes (HR = 1.04, p = 0.6876) were
not significantly different from those with condominiums. Compared to cash-out refinance,
purchase money (HR = 1.16, p < 0.01) and no cash-out refinance (HR = 1.06, p < 0.001) mortgages
were less likely to recover from a delinquency state. In this transition, it was shown that the
loan term (HR = 1.0, p = 0.8768), the original principal balance (HR = 1.0, p = 0.9732), being a
borrower whose employer relocates their employees (HR = 1.08, p = 0.4639) and the number of units
(HR = 0.988, p = 0.592) were not significant.
Default to Current Transition (Cure or Recovery)
There are several ways by which lenders or loan servicers can resolve a defaulted mortgage.
Usually, the recovery of distressed borrowers from a default state back to current or normal performance
allowing borrowers to keep their homes is a desirable policy objective. Designing successful mortgage
modification and cure policies requires knowing why homeowners default and which factors increase
the likelihood to cure. Table 7, Column (4) presents the factors explaining recovery of distressed
borrowers from a default state back to a current state. This transition also represents the cure or recovery
of distressed borrowers from an advanced stage of mortgage delinquency back normal performance
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(current). As expected, higher borrowers’ credit scores (HR = 1.03, p < 0.01) and higher number of
borrowers per loan (HR = 1.09, p < 0.01) significantly increased the chances of borrowers to recover,
since they usually reflect higher ability and willingness to service the mortgage. As also expected,
higher debt-to-income ratio (HR = 0.996, p < 0.01), higher loan-to-value ratio (HR = 0.991, p < 0.01),
higher principal balance (HR = 1.01, p < 0.01), higher number of units (HR = 0.828, p < 0.01) and
higher original interest rate (HR = 0.804, p < 0.01) reduced the chances of recovering for defaulted
borrowers. This result suggests that the extent of indebtedness and mortgage costs plays an important
role in explaining the likelihood of mortgage cure.
Compared to cash-out refinance, purchase money (HR = 1.36, p < 0.01) were more likely to
recover whilst no cash-out refinance (HR = 1.03, p < 0.01) mortgages were not significantly different.
It was also shown that the loan term, the origination channel, being a first-time homebuyer and the
type of occupancy were not significant factors.
4.4. Model Validation
While Table 7 presents the factors that affect transition into various loan outcomes, the evaluation
of the performance of these models is essential. The traditional classification problem is based on
the cross-sectional classification of subjects into a simple binary outcome, typically the presence or
absence of default. In classifying individuals as defaulted or not, a marker is prone to two types of error
and research is typically conducted to minimise these two errors by using covariates that maximise
both high sensitivity and specificity. The model’s classification accuracy is commonly quantified
using a single-number summary measure such as the area under the ROC curve (AUROC) (see, e.g.,
Kelly and O’Malley 2016; Kruppa et al. 2013; Bellotti and Crook 2013; Chamboko and Bravo 2016).
This approach plots the models’ performance based on the true and false positives. The mostly
accepted minimum AUROC curve for a model to be deemed good is 0.7 whilst an AUROC curve
of 0.5 would mean that the model does not have discriminant ability and is not different from
randomness (Hosmer et al. 2013; Chamboko and Bravo 2019b). Implicit in the use of traditional
diagnostic measures are current-status definitions of default. In a more general case of multi-state
models, the states in the progression of a mortgage loan change with time and adjustments are
necessary to include state transition timing in definitions of prognostic errors rates, i.e., time-dependent
ROC curve methods extending the traditional concepts of sensitivity and specificity are needed to
characterise prognostic accuracy. Two extensions for classification measures are commonly proposed in
the literature. The first corresponds to the consideration of cumulative (prevalent) cases recruited over
a fixed period baseline or a landmark starting time point and a future follow-up time point to define
cases (see, e.g., Heagerty et al. 2000). In a multi-state approach, the binary classification error concepts
have to be extended to risk sets leading to the adoption of an alternative incident cases definition
where loans who experience an event at time t are the time-specific cases of interest (see, e.g.,
mboxcitealpB48-risks-765210). This approach is better suited to the proportional hazards Cox
regression model which is based on the fundamental concept of a time-varying risk set of individuals,
and associated time-specific “cases” or subjects who experience the event (e.g., delinquency) at a
given time. The latter approach was used in this study. For the four transition models analysed, the
set of loans at risk of an event were partitioned into a training set of imminent cases (loans which
experience the transition event) and a test set of “controls” (loans which have not yet experienced the
event). Table 8 shows that the four transition models had good and acceptable predictive performance
almost or above the 0.7 threshold. We note that the discriminative power of the models for the initial
transitions from current to delinquent and from current to prepaid is higher than that for the recovery
process transitions from delinquent or default to current.
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Table 8. AUROC curves.
Model AUROC Curve Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval
Current to Prepaid 0.7830 0.0021 0.77876–0.78718
Current to Delinquent 0.7968 0.0015 0.79380–0.79980
Delinquent to Current 0.6913 0.0083 0.68359–0.71604
Default to Current 0.7110 0.0024 0.70639–0.71569
The AUROC curves can also be graphically illustrated, as shown on Figures 10–13 The further the
ROC curve is to the right of 45◦ diagonal of the ROC area, the less predictive is the model. On the
other hand, the more the curve is to the left, the more predictive it is.Risks 2020, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW 23 of 29 
 
 
Figure 10. Current to prepaid. 
 
Figure 11. Current to delinquent. 
 
Figure 12. Delinquent to current. 
i r . rr t t r i .
isks 2020, 8,    I  23 f 29 
 
 
  rr t   
 
i r  . rr t t  li t. 
 
i r  . li t t  c rr t. 
Figu e 11. Cu ent to delinquent.
Risks 2020, 8, 64 23 of 28
Risks 2020, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW 23 of 29 
 
 
Figure 10. Current to prepaid. 
 
Figure 11. Current to delinquent. 
 
Figure 12. Delinquent to current. .Risks 2020, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW 24 of 29 
 
 
Figure 13. Default to current. 
We note that, since the loans status changes over time, as does its risk characteristics and other 
exogenous conditions, the model’s ability to discriminate between cases and controls also changes 
and cannot be directly compared with that of traditional binary outcome models. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we adopt a multi-state approach to modelling the progression of borrowers from 
one state to another to fully understand the risks of a cohort of borrowers over time. We introduce a 
multi-state framework with seven allowable states: current (normal performance), delinquent, 
default, repurchase, foreclosure, short sale and prepaid. Additionally, we investigate the relationship 
between the probability of loans transitioning to and from various loan outcomes using both 
acquisition and performance explanatory variables. We tested this framework using the Fannie Mae 
data with a cohort of borrowers whose loans were initiated during the first quarter of 2009 and were 
followed for 92 months until the third quarter of 2016. Our findings have broader policy implications 
for contract design, lender and borrower behaviour analysis; for the mitigation of defaults and 
foreclosures through the design of debt relief programs and mortgage modification policies; for 
pricing of mortgage-backed securities; and for the design of laws protecting distressed borrowers. 
The transition matrix shows that about 11.6% of the borrowers did not transition to any other 
state but remained current on their payments during the study follow-up period. Conversely, this 
means the other 88.4% of the borrowers transitioned into some risky state according to the contractual 
agreement. As high as 71.4% of the borrowers transitioned from the current state into prepaid, thus 
having paid the mortgage loan more quickly than the contractually agreed time. This shows a 
massive risk to lenders as potential income from interest is lost because of prepayment. Moreover, 
since high-quality borrowers are more likely to prepay (or renegotiate), there is a real risk that the 
prepayment option is exercised by high-quality borrowers, thus lowering the average quality of the 
loan pool. However, the probability of prepayment rose towards the end of the study follow up 
period, suggesting that prepayment penalties could be in effect helping to preserve the contract 
provisions for the first few years. The results also show that 16.9% of the borrowers missed at least 
one payment, thus transitioned from current into a delinquent state. Of those who entered a 
delinquent state, most of them (70.6%) recovered (cured), while 27.1% defaulted. Importantly, about 
three quarters of those who entered a default state also recovered to a current state. Overall, there 
were reasonable recovery rates for those who entered delinquency and default state, signalling the 
ability of borrowers to recover from financial distress. Even though recovery of the defaulters was 
reasonably high, another quarter transitioned to an absorbing state with most of them (12.7%) 
progressing into foreclosure, whilst 6% and 5.4%, respectively, transitioned to short sale and prepaid. 
In terms of the factors affecting the transition into various loan outcomes, we see the cross-cutting 
importance of ability to pay as measured by debt-to-income ratio, equity as marked by loan-to-value 
ratio, interest rates, and the property type.  
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5. Conclusions
In this paper, we adopt a multi-state approach to modelling the progression of borrowers from
one state to another to fully understand the risks of a cohort of borrowers over time. We introduce a
multi-state framework with seven allowable states: current (normal performance), delinquent, default,
repurchase, foreclosure, short sale and prepaid. Additionally, we investigate the relationship between
the probability of loans transitioning to and from various loan outcomes using both acquisition and
performance explanatory variables. We tested this framework using the Fannie Mae data with a
cohort of borrowers whose loans were initiated during the first quarter of 2009 and were followed for
92 months until the third quarter of 2016. Our findings have broader policy implications for contract
design, lender and borrower behaviour analysis; for the mitigation of defaults and foreclosures through
the design of debt relief programs and mortgage modification policies; for pricing of mortgage-backed
securities; and for the design of laws protecting distressed borrowers.
The transition matrix shows that about 11.6% of the borrowers did not transition to any other state
but remained current on their payments during the study follow-up period. Conversely, this means the
other 88.4% of the borrowers transitioned into some risky state according to the contractual agreement.
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As high as 71.4% of the borrowers transitioned from the current state into prepaid, thus having paid
the mortgage loan more quickly than the contractually agreed time. This shows a massive risk to
lenders as potential income from interest is lost because of prepayment. Moreover, since high-quality
borrowers are more likely to prepay (or renegotiate), there is a real risk that the prepayment option is
exercised by high-quality borrowers, thus lowering the average quality of the loan pool. However,
the probability of prepayment rose towards the end of the study follow up period, suggesting that
prepayment penalties could be in effect helping to preserve the contract provisions for the first few
years. The results also show that 16.9% of the borrowers missed at least one payment, thus transitioned
from current into a delinquent state. Of those who entered a delinquent state, most of them (70.6%)
recovered (cured), while 27.1% defaulted. Importantly, about three quarters of those who entered a
default state also recovered to a current state. Overall, there were reasonable recovery rates for those
who entered delinquency and default state, signalling the ability of borrowers to recover from financial
distress. Even though recovery of the defaulters was reasonably high, another quarter transitioned
to an absorbing state with most of them (12.7%) progressing into foreclosure, whilst 6% and 5.4%,
respectively, transitioned to short sale and prepaid. In terms of the factors affecting the transition
into various loan outcomes, we see the cross-cutting importance of ability to pay as measured by
debt-to-income ratio, equity as marked by loan-to-value ratio, interest rates, and the property type.
We conclude that jointly modelling the described state occupations and transitions allows a
system-wide helicopter view, which provides a holistic understanding of the dynamics of a mortgage
loan portfolio more than just modelling prepayment, foreclosure, delinquency, recovery, repurchase and
short sale separately. We therefore recommend that, during times of economic distress, the focus should
go beyond modelling defaults and foreclosures as the only main outcomes, especially on mortgage
loans as other transitions and state occupation experienced by borrowers becomes critically essential.
One powerful feature of the multi-state class of models is the potential for the inclusion of
individual, loan-level or macroeconomic time-dependent covariates which explain the transition
intensity between states. The loan-specific probabilities of transitioning between states change in
response to variations in loan and borrower characteristics, property characteristics or behavioural
variables. They also change in response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. For instance,
in our model, the household’s income enters indirectly via the debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, house
price information enters via the Loan to Value ratio (LTV) and the yield curve dynamics enters
through loan-specific interest rate information. In this paper, we model intensities as functions of both
acquisition and performance loan level explanatory variables considering only idiosyncratic factors as
well as dynamic variables that depends on past transition history.
For retail portfolios, a natural extension of this paper being worked out is to explicitly include
common macroeconomic time variables (e.g., employment rates, gross domestic product change,
consumption, stock market performance, consumer price index and share of non-performing loans)
as covariates to explain the transition intensity between states. The recently introduced IFRS9
standards require financial institutions to calculate expected loss for the banking book over the
entire life of the exposures, conditional on macroeconomic factors, on a point-in-time basis (and not
through-the-cycle, i.e., neutralising economic fluctuations as required under the Basel framework),
including forward-looking information. The inclusion of common macroeconomic variables as
drivers of loan or portfolio default and of credit risk migration can be done in several ways, e.g.,
by combining a point-in-time credit scoring model with only idiosyncratic factors (e.g., age, income,
past credit behaviour, delinquency history and loan amount) with an ex-post inclusion of the common
macroeconomic time variables. One example is Stein et al. (2010) which use a Cox proportional hazard
model with time-varying covariates to represent the systematic risk factors for mortgage portfolios and
model survival times. Another option is to consider general multinomial scoring transition models for
each row of the transition matrix (see, e.g., Nyström and Skoglund 2006). Another approach entails the
use of dynamic Markov credit scoring models which explicitly incorporate idiosyncratic and common
macroeconomic credit factors as well as past transition behaviour (see, e.g., Skoglund and Chen 2016).
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These models typically entail more complex path-dependent structures in which delinquency history
is important to forecast credit losses, repayment behaviour, revenue generation, liquidity, capital
requirements and other measures in a total balance sheet approach. For simpler applications, further
research may be conducted empirically to compare the predictive accuracy of the multi-state model
with that of traditional two-state credit scoring models tracking default.
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